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The quantum approach to human reasoning does explain the belief-bias effect
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Based on the ideas of quantum physics and dual-process theory of human reasoning that takes
into account two primary mechanisms of reasoning : 1) deductive rational thinking and 2) intuitive
heuristic judgment, we proposed the ”quantum” approach to practical human logic that allows one
to specify the most distinctive peculiarities in activity of two reasoning systems mentioned above
and in addition to describe phenomenologically well-established experimentally belief-bias effect .
PACS numbers: 05.40.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that some essential human values and con-
cepts may be incompatable with each other had orig-
inated long before the beginning of scientific psychol-
ogy. By distinct ways this idea was justified by such
outstanding philosophers and thinkers as G.W. Leibniz,
N.Machiavelli and I. Kant. The interested reader can
find detail account of the history of this idea with rele-
vant references in [1]. However only in the XX century
with the rise of quantum theory this idea has received ad-
equate scientific expression in the language of the Bohr’s
Complementarity Principle. We shall give here only two
distinctive quotations of founding fathers of quantum me-
chanics that are clearly demonstrating their profound un-
derstanding of the inconsistancy of some basic concepts
relating to human psychology. So, in the paper of 1948
”On the Notions of Causality and Complementarity” N.
Bohr wrote:”Recognition of complementary relationship
is not least required in psychology, where the conditions
for analysis and synthesis of experience exhibit striking
analogy with the situation in atomic physis. In fact, the
use of words like thoughts, and sentiments, equally in-
dispensable to illustrate the diversity of psychical experi-
ence, pertain to mutually exclusive situations character-
ized by a different drawing of the line of separation be-
tween subject and object. In particular, the place left for
the feeling of volition is afforded by the very circumstance
that situations where we experience freedom of will are
incompatible with psychological situations where causal
analysis is reasonably attempted. In other words, when
we use the phrase ”I will” we renounce explanatory argu-
mentation. In fact, the use which we make of words like
”thought” and ”feeling,” or ”instinct” and ”reason” to
describe psychic experiences of different types, shows the
existence of characteristic relationships of complementar-
ity conditioned by the peculiarity of introspection” [2].
On the other hand W.Pauli drew particular attention
to the problem of relation between complementarity of
mental and physical aspects of the same reality. In his
∗Electronic address: vol@ilt.kharkov.ua
inspiring paper ”The influence of archetypal ideas on the
scientific theories of Kepler” [2] he wrote:” “The general
problem of the relationship between psyche and physics,
between inside and outside, will hardly be solved with
the notion of a ‘psychophysical parallelism, put forward
in the past century. However, modern science has per-
haps brought us closer to a more satisfying conception of
this relationship insofar as it introduced the concept of
complementarity within physics. It would be most satis-
factory if physis and psyche could be conceived as com-
plementary aspects of the same reality.”.Unfortunately
at the time these deep ideas are not influenced the de-
velopment of experimental psychology. All the more
remarkable that modern cognitive psychology irrespec-
tively came in fact to the similar conclusions.In partic-
ular numerous experts in so different areas of cognitive
psychology as attention,memory,decision making, learn-
ing with one accord believe that dual processes and dual
systems play fundamental role for nearly all basic cog-
nitive mechanisms in human mind (see e.g. [4] for brief
review of dual-process theory in reasoning with the list
of necessary references).In what follows we are interested
only in human reasoning where two primary dual systems
of interest can be specified. One of these systems we will
call it below as deductive reasoning system (DRS) is ra-
tional, sequental and consistent but acts relatively slow
while the other - we will call it further as heuristic rea-
soning system (HRS) is intuitive, fast, automatic, but
to a large extent influenced by emotions and last uncon-
sious experience.Numerous researches and experiments
conclusively proved that there is hidden interaction be-
tween these two cognitive systems such that a reasoning
subject is not aware of this.The belief-bias effect is the
most striking manifestation of such interaction. Roughly
speaking the belief-bias effect is the innate tendency of
reasoning subjects to be more likely to accept reasons
ang arguments if they find them believable and to pay
less attention of their logical validity. The main goal of
present paper is based on quantum ideas of complemen-
tarity and dual-process theory in human reasoning to de-
scribe the belief-bias effect phenomenologically by purely
logical tools. To this end we will use also the simplified
version of discrete-continuous logic that was formulated
earlier in author preprint [5].
2The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In chapter 2 we briefly remind basic facts relating to
discrete-continuous logic (DCL) that are necessary for
the understanding of the present paper.The main contri-
bution of this chapter is the interpretation of the gen-
eral propositions in DCL as the integral mental struc-
tures that consist both of logical and heuristic con-
stituents. Under such interpretation these two con-
stituents of the proposition can be considered as com-
plementary to each other exactly like two noncommut-
ing observables in quantum mechanics.In chapter 3 we
state the uncertainty relation that just reflects the com-
plementary nature of such concepts as logical rigour and
the heuristic grasp. And finally in chapter 4 using only
logical tools we give the phenomenological explanation
of the belief-bias effect. Now let us go to the details.
II. PRELIMINIRIES
In this part we briefly remind for the reader con-
venience the necessary facts relating to the discrete -
continuous logic that were outlined more detail in au-
thor preprint [5]. So, we will consider as the primary
objects of our study the set of general propositions (GP)
-{Aj} that may be represented by 2× 2 positive definite
matrices with unit trace of the following form:
Aj =
(
pj iαj
−iαj 1− pj
)
, (1)
(where i is imaginary unit). In this case the negation of
such proposition - (not Aj) may be defined as (not A) =(
1− pj −iαj
iαj pj
)
. It turns out that in addition to negation
another but already two place operation -△ (which is
the analogue of strong disjunction in ordinary Boolean
logic) can be introduced in DCL according to the next
definition:
Let A =
(
p iα
−iα 1− p
)
and B =
(
q iβ
−iβ 1− q
)
then
(A△ B) =
(
R iγ
−iγ 1−R
)
, (2)
where R = p+q−2pq+2αβ, γ = α (1− 2q)+β (1− 2p).
Comparing representation Eq. (1) with standard form of
density matrix of the mixed state of two-level quantum
system that looks as ρ =
(
1+Pz
2
Px−iPy
2
Px+iPy
2
1−Pz
2
)
(where P =
(Px, Py, Pz) is the Bloch vector of the state ) we see that
GP may be represented by the similar way but in this
case x− component of the Bloch vector is equal to zero.
In the rest of the paper we will use such reduced Bloch
representation for the arbitrary proposition A, that is:
A =
(
1+Pz
2
−iPy
2
iPy
2
1−Pz
2
)
with P = (Py , Pz). In this case
it is convenient to introduce the complex vector P =
Pz − iPy which we call further as representating vector
(RV) of proposition A. It is easy to verify directly that
the RV of proposition (notA) is equal to (−P ) and RV of
proposition (A△ B) is equal to (−PQ) (where Q is RV
of B ).Note also the useful relation connecting negation
with operation △:
not(A△B) ≡ (A△B) = (notA)△B = A△ (notB). (3)
It should be noted that unlike of ordinary Boolean logic
in DCL it is possible to define the whole one-parameter
group of continuous logical operations (logical rotations
of propositions in the plane Py − Pz) according to the
following rule: if proposition A has the RV -P then ro-
tated at an angle Φ proposition A
1
has RV - P 1 with
components:
P
1
y = Py cosφ+ Pz sinΦ
P
1
z = Pz cosΦ− Py sinΦ (4)
It is easy to see that the negation of any proposition co-
incides with logical rotation of it at an angle pi and in
addition that if one rotates the GP A at an angle Φ1 and
the other proposition B at an angle Φ2 then the propo-
sition (A△B) will be rotated at an angle Φ1+Φ2. Thus
all logical operations in DCL obtain quite clear geometric
meaning. Now after describing the syntax of DCL we can
pass to the more difficult task: clarification of its seman-
tics that is the interpretation both the meaning of general
propositions and logical operations with them. It should
be noted that interpretation that we are going to propose
here is not the only possible but it is appropriate for our
ultimate goal namely to explain the beliefe-bias effect in
human reasoning from pure logical point of view. So, as
before we will assume that diagonal elements of repre-
senting matrix for arbitrary GP describes degree of its
logical validity (from DRS point of view) while its non-
diagonal elements we will interpret as the believability
of the same proposition inspired by the heuristic reason-
ing system (HRS). This interpretation can be expressed
more precisely as follows. Let us introduce two projec-
tion operators:P1 and P2
(
P 21 = P1, P
2
2 = P2
)
according
to the definition: P1 =
1+σz
2 and P2 =
1+σy
2 . It is easy
to see that average values of these operators in the state
whose density matrix coincides with representating ma-
trix of proposition A =
(
p iα
−iα 1− p
)
give us the propa-
bilities of its logical plausability pt and its believability
pb respectively.Thus we obtain
pt = 〈P1〉 = Sp(P1A) = p
and (5)
pc = 〈P2〉 = Sp(P2A) =
1− 2α
2
In connection with above interpretation we want to
point out two important marginal GP: 1) T =
(
1 0
0 0
)
-
3true proposition, and 2) B =
(
1
2 −
i
2
i
2
1
2
)
- highest pos-
sible believable proposition and their negations: F =
(notT )−false proposition and U = (notB)-unbelievable
proposition. Note in addition that noncommutativity of
operators P1and P2 implies that main predicates of arbi-
trary GP (plausibility and belief) may be considered as
complementary (in the sence of quantum theory) aspects
of the same proposition. This important fact implies spe-
cific uncertainty relation for the observables P1and P2
connected with any GP. The simple derivation of these
relation is the subject of the next section of the presenr
paper.
III. THE UNCERTAINTY RELATION
BETWEEN PREDICATES PLAUSIBILITY AND
BELIEVABILITY IN DCL.
To derive the required uncertainty relation it is con-
venient to represent any GP A in the Bloch form:
A =
(
1+Pz
2
−iPy
2
iPy
2
1−Pz
2
)
.According to definition the un-
certainty of logical truth for the proposition A can
be written with the help of operator P1 =
1+σz
2 as:
△p2t ≡
(
1+σz
2 −
1+σz
2
)2
= 14
(
1− σz
2
)
=
1−P 2z
4 .In the
similar manner the uncertainty of believability of the
same proposition is equal to : △pc =
1
4
(
1− σy
2
)
=
1
4
(
1− P 2y
)
.By adding these two expressions we obtain:
△p2A ≡ △p
2
t + △p
2
c =
1
4
(
2− P 2y − P
2
z
)
.Finally taking
into accout that P 2y + P
2
z 6 1 we get the desired rela-
tions:
1
4
6 △p2A 6
1
2
. (6)
The notable fact should be mentioned here:if one takes
two propositions A and B with RV P and Q respectively
then according above calculation one can write two equa-
tions 1) △p2A =
(2−P 2)
4 and 2)△p
2
B =
(2−Q2)
4 .
On the other hand as we marked earlier the proposi-
tion (A△B) has RV (−PQ) and hence its uncertainty
is equal to △ p2(A△B) =
(2−P 2Q2)
4 .As long as P
2Q2 ≦
P 2, Q2 one can conclude that △p2(A△B) > (△p
2
A,△p
2
B)
and hence as a final result of logical operation △ the
ending uncertainty of proposition can only increases.We
would like to hope that properly organized experiments
with specially selected reasoning tasks will be able to con-
firm (or may be disprove) the proposed uncertainty rela-
tions (6).Now we come back to the main goal of present
paper: the explanation of the belief-bias effect in human
reasoning.
IV. MANY VALUED PROBABILISTIC LOGIC
AND THE BELIEF-BIAS EFFECT.
In this part we will try to describe (phenomenologi-
cally) the belief-bias effect in human reasoning by purely
logical tools.For this purpose it is convenient to use some
version of probabilistic many-valued logic that in some
sense can be considered as simplified version of orig-
inal DCL.Really if in original version of DCL we re-
strict ourselves only by discrete set of logical rotations
with angles: 0, 2pi
N
... 2pi
N
(N − 1) we obtain the closed logic
with N marginal propositions which possess represent-
ing matrices: A0, A1....AN−1 (where A0 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, ...
Ak =
(
1+cos 2pi
N
2 −
i
2 sin
2pi
N
i
2 sin
2pi
N
1−cos 2pi
N
2
)
(k = 1..N − 1)). In the case
when we are not interested in the ”quantum correla-
tions” between these marginal propositions we can con-
sider them as approximately independent quantities and
associate with these propositions the logical basis consist-
ing of N distinct logical alternatives.Acting in this man-
ner one can pass from original DCL to standard many-
valued probabilistic Boolean logic. After this remark we
will examine further four valued probabilistic logic every
proposition of which can be represented as 4 × 4 diago-
nal matrix : A = diag (P1, P2, P3, P4).Here we mean that
the space of these propositions is a tensor product of two
spaces with 2× 2 diagonal matrices, that is:
A =
∑
i
aiTi ⊗Bi, (7)
where Ti =
(
pi 0
0 1− pi
)
, Bi =
(
qi 0
0 1− qi
)
and∑
i
ai = 1. In addition we assume that matri-
ces Ti in the decomposition Eq. (7) are associ-
ated with the activity of deductive cognitive sub-
system (DRS),while matrices Bi are connected with
its heuristic subsystem (HRS).Thus the basis of this
logic consists of four propositions:1) truth-believable
TB = diag(1, 0, 0, 0), 2) truth-unbelievable TU =
diag(0, 1, 0, 0), 3)false-believable FB = diag(0, 0, 1, 0)
and 4)false- unbelievable FU = diag(0, 0, 0, 1).Our
next step is to define basic logical operations that
can be implemented with such propositions. The in-
terpetation that we have adopted above implies that
the negation of proposition A must be defined as
(notA) = diag (P4, P3, P2, P1). The certain dilemma
arises however when we want to define the conjunc-
tion of two propositions A = diag (P1, P2, P3, P4) and
B = diag (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4). We have proposed here the
following definition:
C ≡ (AandB) = diag (C1, C2, C3, C4) , (8)
where C1 = P1 (Q1 +Q2) + P2Q1, C2 = P2Q2, C3 =
P1 (Q3 +Q4)+P2Q3+P3+P4 (Q1 +Q3), C4 = P2Q4+
P4 (Q2 +Q4). This definition of conjuction namely Eq.
4(8) certainly needs to be explained.First of all we note
that definition Eq. (8) satisfies to the necessary sym-
metry condition : (AandB) = (BandA)as it should
be.In addition if one takes the projection of conjunc-
tion Eq. (8) in DRS (first reasoning subsystem) the re-
sult is:(AandB)1 =
(
pq 0
0 1− pq
)
≡ (A1andB1) where
p = P1+P2 and q = Q1+Q2. This result obviously con-
sistent with definition of conjunction in ordinary proba-
bilistic Boolean logic. On the other hand if one takes the
projection of Eq. (8) in HRS (second reasoning subsys-
tem) the obtained result reads as:
(AandB)2 =
(
1− (P2 + P4) (Q2 +Q4)
(P2 + P4) (Q2 +Q4)
)
. (9)
We see that conjunction in heuristic system differs from
standatd logical conjunction .In our opinion this distinc-
tion explicitly reflects (from phenomenological point of
view) the essential difference existing between two rea-
soning systems when they operate jointly. In particu-
lar the definition Eq. (9) implies for two basic marginal
propositions in second reasoning subsystem: B =
(
1 0
0 0
)
responding to the statement of unconditional belief and
D =
(
0 0
0 1
)
-which is the most doubtful statement, the
next conjunction relations:(BandB) = B, (BandD) =
(DandB) = B and (DandD) = D.Thus we obtain that
the unconditional belief when it conflicts with certain
doubtful one always overcomes it. Now if one takes the
expression Eq. (8) for granted then he (she)can define
another logical operations (in particular implication that
we especially interested in ) without any obstacles.To this
end one should be guided by two relations of ordinary
logic which as we assume continue to be valid in our
case as well: 1) (AorB) = not [(notA) and (notB)] and
2) (A =⇒ B) = (notA) orB .Acting in this manner we
obtain for the implication (A =⇒ B) the required rela-
tion:
I ≡ (A =⇒ B) = diag (I1, I2, I3, I4) , (10)
where I1 = p4 (q1 + q3) + p2q1, I2 = p3 + q2 (1− p3) +
p1q1 + p4q4, I3 = p2q3, I4 = p1 (q3 + q4) + p2q4. The ex-
pression Eq. (10) for the implication of two probabilistic
propositions in four- valued logic is the foundation for our
following explanation of bias-belief effect.Note that here
we are going to demonstrate only the simplest case of the
application of the approach proposed. The detail quanti-
tative analysis of numerous possible situations connected
with the interaction between DRS and HRS will be re-
alized by us at length in separate publication. So, let us
take the proposition B- (consequent of the implication)
in the form: B = diag (1, 0, 0, 0), that means that conse-
quent is both true and believable proposition. Then the
expression Eq. (10) implies that matrix (A =⇒ B) has
the form:
(A =⇒ B) = diag (p2 + p4, p1 + p3, 0, 0) , (11)
and hence its projections in DRS (1) and HRS (2) sys-
tems are respectively : (A =⇒ B)1 =
(
1
0
)
, and
(A =⇒ B)2 =
(
p2 + p4
p1 + p3
)
On the other hand if one choose the consequent B in
the form B = diag (0, 1, 0, 0) that means that consiquent
B is true but unbelievable proposition then according to
expression (10) one obtain for the implication (A =⇒ B)
the relation:
(A =⇒ B) = diag (0, 1, 0, 0) , (12)
and hence the projections of this proposition in
two cognitive systems are:(A =⇒ B)1 =
(
1
0
)
and
(A =⇒ B)2 =
(
0
1
)
.
Now if we make the natural assumption that after the
first ( unconscious) stage of reasoning, when two cogni-
tive systems operate jointly, at the second stage the con-
scious evaluation of the validity of a conclusion V occurs
in accordance with the simple rule:
V = aPt + (1− a)Pb, (13)
(where a (0 6 a 6 1) is certain number coefficient de-
pending on age,intellect,training of the subject and pos-
sibly some other factors).Note that this assumption in
fact coincides with similar rule which was used in the
paper [4]. Now returning to the above example of in-
terest we result in that the magnitude of the bias-belief
effect V can be evaluate quantitatively as V ≡ V1−V2 =
(1− a) (p2 + p4).We believe that although the value of
coefficient a is unknown in advance nevertheless the va-
lidity of the Eq. (13) can be explicitly verified in seria of
properly organized psychological experiments with vari-
ous subjects using the identical cognitive tasks .
In conclusion of our study let us formulate once more
the central results of the present paper:
1)We introduced the novel version of DCL with both
discrete and continuous logical operations between gen-
eralized propositions .
2)We proposed the concrete interpretation of proposi-
tions in DCL as integral mental structures that include
both logical and heuristic constituents.
3)We stated the specific uncertainty relation between
logic rigour and heuritic grasp that reflect complemen-
tary aspects of human reasoning process.
4)We proposed phenomenological model of human rea-
soning based on simplified version of DCL and demon-
strated that it is able to explain belief-bias effect quali-
tatively and possibly quantitatively as well.
All these conclusions we hope to discuss more detail in
our further publications.
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